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TAX STATUS OF SUBDIVISIONS UNDER
THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Alfred Fellows Miller*
P ROCEEDS ARISING FROM the sale of lots in a subdivision project
are taxable under the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code
as either ordinary or capital gains income depending upon the
accounting asset classification pursuant to which the property
is held, whether held by an individual, a partnership, a trustee,
or a corporation. From an accounting standpoint, in terms of
balance sheet classification, the asset land, whether owned by a
natural or juristic person, may be listed as "for sale," as an
investment, or as a fixed asset, but in the terminology of the
Internal Revenue Code, land is classified as a capital or non.
capital asset.' After the accounting asset classification of the
land has been determined, the tax liability of the subdivision
owner is then expressed in terms of capital or non-capital assets,
and ordinary or capital gains income.
Typical of the way in which the tax issue may arise and
illustrative of the consequences which may follow is the case of
Mauldin v. Commissioner2 wherein the court indicated that the
* J. D., Northwestern University School of Law, 1932. Member, Illinois Bar.
1 The accounting equivalent of a capital asset, is one held for investment; the
non-capital assets being those held for sale and those described as fixed assets.
The Code definition of capital assets, as well as the exclusions therefrom, is to
be found in 26 U. S. C. A. § 117(a) (1), for the 1939 Code, and in Section 1221
of the 1954 Code.
2195 F. (2d) 714 (1952).
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problem was one as to whether or not certain lots sold were
"property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers
in the ordinary course of his trade or business" within the
exclusionary clause of Section 117(a)(1) of the Code. If so,
the gain from the sale of the lots constituted ordinary income
taxable under Section 117(a)(1); if not, a capital gains tax
became payable.
For the purpose of arriving at a solution to this problem,
certain tests have been devised. These tests were once succinctly
stated in the following manner:
determining whether the sales . . . involve properties held
primarily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of
business or properties held for investment presents a factual
question involving a consideration of all the pertinent facts
and circumstances. . . . Among the factors primarily em-
phasized are the taxpayer's purpose in acquiring the prop-
erty, the continuity, frequency, and substantiality of the
transactions, and the sales activity in relation thereto. No
one of such tests is determinative.3
But it cannot be said that the mere making of statements concern-
ing these rules, as expressed in decisions and in articles on the
subject,4 is enough to make them either understood or capable
3 See Ralph H. Horton, TCM (CCH Dec. 20,573M. 1954). See also Austin v.
United States, 116 F. Supp. 283 at 285 (1953), and Boomhower v. United States,
74 F. Supp. 997 (1947).
4 Texts on the subject include Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation (Cal-
laghan & Co., Chicago, 1942), § 22.08; Paul and Mertens, Law of Federal Income
Taxation (Callaghan & Co., Chicago, 1934-5), § 19.15; Montgomery, Federal Taxes
(Ronald Press Co., New York, 1954), 35th Ed., pp. 9-11; Plaxton, Canadian Income
Tax Law (Carswell & Co., Ltd., Toronto, 1947), 2d Ed., pp. 213 and 248: 17 C. J. S.,
Internal Revenue, § 161. Articles include those by P. Miller, "The 'Capital Asset'
Concept," 59 Yale L. J. 837 and 1057 (1950); Malley, "Is Original Purpose Con-
trolling," Eighth Ann. Inst. on Fed. Taxation (1950), p. 845; Clark, "Distinguish-
ing Between Dealer and Investor Sales by Same Taxpayer," op. cit., p. 855;
Shaw, "When Does a Seller of Real Estate Become a Dealer," U. of So. Cal.
Tax Inst. Proceedings, 1950 Major Problems, p. 325; Allison, "When and How to
be a Dealer Rather Than an Investor," N. Y. U. Sixth Ann. Inst. on Fed.
Taxation, pp. 444 and 454; Reznick, "Tax Problems in Liquidation," 26 Taxes 1109
(1948): Troll, "The Sale of Unimproved or Subdivided Land," 25 Taxes 441
(1947); Fink, "Dealing in Real Estate," 2 Tax L. Rev. 111 (1946); Lerner,
"When is One a Real Estate Dealer," 24 Taxes 645 (1946) ; Brodsky, "Converting
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of being applied for nowhere in the statute does the term
"dealer" or the term "investor" appear 5 although most writers
proceed to discuss the issue from the standpoint of when an
individual is to be considered a dealer and when an investor.
6
In the language of the Code, the question is one as to whether
or not the property is held "primarily for sale," and is a fact
question. This could be rephrased as whether the property is
held in the accounting classification describing property held for
sale. An eminent legal author has written on the subject of the
Law of Accounting. T Upon the briefest reflection, then, it should
be apparent that when, under a statute, the question of the
accounting classification of the asset land arises, it is a legal
question, and the courts, in determining and applying Section
117(a) (1), have been determining legal questions even though
such decisions have accounting consequences.
No problem will arise in the case of a corporate holder be-
cause, as noted hereafter, the issue would be determined by the
extent of the corporate powers as measured by the law relating
to corporations. Nor will it arise in the case of a dealer whose
principal and actual occupation is the real estate business. It
is only with respect to the individual taxpayer whose principal
occupation is not in the real estate business that there is a
problem. As to such a person, the issue as to whether land is
held in the "for sale" classification turns on a further question
concerning the intention of the particular individual. As the net
result of the decisions on the subject has been the formulation of
certain rules of evidence to be used to ascertain this intention,
Ordinary Assets into Capital Assets," N. Y. U. Thirteenth Annual Inst. on Fed.
Taxation (1955) ; and Piper, "Certain Changes in Capital Gain or Loss Treatment
Under the 1954 Code," ibid. See also Seltzer, The Nature and Tax Treatment
of Capital Gains and Losses (Nat. Bur. of Econ. Research, 1951), pp. 211-5, and
McMichael, Subdivisions (Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1953). The latter
presents the matter from the real estate point of view.
5 Note, in particular, Allison, "When and How to be a Dealer Rather than an
Investor," N. Y. U. Sixth Ann. Inst. on Fed. Taxation, pp. 444 and 454; Shaw
"When Does a Seller of Real Estate Become a Dealer," U. of So. Cal. Tax Inst.
Proceedings, 1950 Major Problems, p. 325.
I It may be noted that courts occasionally mention these terms but, when they
do so, it is not by way of statutory construction.
7 See Hills, "The Law of Accounting," 54 Col. L. Rev. 1 and 1049 (1954).
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it is believed that a discussion of these cases should be of benefit.
To eliminate confusion, however, the discussion will be restricted
to cases involving subdivisions, with only occasional mention being
made as to separate parcels. From this discussion, it will be
made to appear that the governing rules are of a character which
could be classed as being reasonably definite and the application
thereof has produced results which may be said to be under-
standable.
I. BASIC STATUTORY CONSIDERATIONS
Before proceeding to an analysis of these cases, it is import-
ant to notice certain fundamental theories which underly the Code
provisions on the point. The draftsmen of the Revenue Act
of 1921, a statute which provided that land was a capital asset,8
apparently overlooked the accounting process by which income
arising from the sale of land should be computed as well as the
relationship of asset classification thereto. The nature of a busi-
ness determines the classification or purpose for which its assets
are held, and the asset classification in turn determines the ac-
counting techniques by which the income on the sale of the
respective types of assets is computed. The computation of tax-
able income is ordinarily made according to accepted principles
of accounting in the manner and to the extent modified by the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, special sections of which
provide the method of computing taxable income with respect to
the major classes of balance sheet assets such as inventories,
investments and fixed assets.' By providing that land was a
capital asset, without specifying whether the owner was engaged
in business or not, this entire process was disregarded.
The accounting aspect involved became inescapable when the
Bureau issued an Office Decision which stated: "A taxpayer
engaged in the real estate business is not permitted to inventory
real estate for the purpose of calculating net income subject to
Federal income tax."1  Stated differently, land, as an asset,
842 Stat. at L. Ch. 136, § 202 (1921).
9 See, for example, Int. Rev. Code 1954, §§ 471-2.
100 .D. 848; 4 C. B. 47 (1921).
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could not be included in inventory for the purpose of computing
income from the sale thereof because of the problem of pricing
or valuing the inventory. This was due in no small part to
the fact that, as a matter of cost and convenience, it would be
inexpedient if not impossible to make periodic appraisals of land
to arrive at a valuation to be used in an inventory accounting
computation. If, instead of professional appraisals, each indi-
vidual taxpayer were permitted to make his own periodic esti-
mate of value, considerable administrative difficulties would
undoubtedly have arisen." As a consequence, the basis provi-
sions controlled and gain or loss was not computed until value
was established by an actual sale.
By an amendment included in the 1924 Act,'2 written to
prevent the taxation of income at capital gain rates as to land
sold by real estate dealers, the principle was recognized that land
held for sale by a business was in the nature of inventory and,
as a consequence, the profit or income from such sales came to
be taxable as ordinary business income even though the principles
of inventory accounting could not be used to make the computa-
tion. Pursuant thereto, the real estate dealer who holds land
in the "for sale" classification reports income from the sale
thereof as ordinary business income. The section, however, had
a far more reaching application since it could extend to the
activities of any individual, whether a dealer or not. If the
operation of a subdivision project or the purchase and sale of
separate parcels of land forms a known and defined part of the
real estate business when carried on to the exclusion of other
activities by a corporation or individual, what reason would
there be to suppose the same result should not follow when the
project represented a venture on the part of an individual who
only incidentally engaged in the real estate business and then
only with reference to a particular project? Ownership of land
being almost universal and the type of business being one "in
"lAlbert F. Keeney, 17 BTA 560 (1929); Atlantic Coast Realty Co., 11 BTA
416 (1928).
1243 Stat. at L., Ch. 234, § 208(a) (8).
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which the prime prerequisite is capital in the form of land,"13
the problem which faced the courts, therefore, was one to deter-
mine whether the individual who had participated in a subdivision
project could be said to have engaged therein to a sufficient extent
that it might be said he had engaged in the real estate business.
If the answer was in the affirmative, the profit derived therefrom
was to be taxed as ordinary business income.
1 4
II. JUDIOIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE CODE
A. GENERAL INTENT TO DO BUSINESS
Approaching the problem from the standpoint of the adjudi-
cated cases, it is important, at the outset, to ascertain whether
the taxpayer has engaged in business at all. The question as
to whether or not an individual can be said to have engaged in
business, as well as the meaning to be given to the term "busi-
ness," has caused interpretation to be given to other sections
of the Code as well as in law generally. The results of these
prior explorations would appear to be implicit, although not
expressly stated, in the cases falling under this topic. For ex-
ample, the definition of business found in Flint v. Stone Tracy
Company 5 and Von Baumbach v. Sargent Land Company,'s
relied upon in the leading subdivision tax case of Richards v.
Commissioner," appears to have had its origin in the first edition
of Noah Webster's Dictionary. This definition was taken over
by the Imperial Dictionary, was referred to in the English case
of Smith v. Anderson,1 and was there applied to real estate
transactions by a court which said that
anything which occupies the time and attention and labour
of a man for the purpose of profit is business. . . . It is a
13 Myra C. Brown, 2 TCM 714 at 717 (1943), affirmed in 143 F. (2d) 468 (1944).
14 Changes made by the 1954 code are noted hereafter. See notes 90 to 92, post.
15 220 11. S. 107, 31 S. Ct. 342, 55 L. Ed. 289 (1911).
16 242 U. S. 503, 37 S. Ct. 201, 61 L. Ed. 460 (1917).
1781 F. (2d) 369, 106 A. L. R. 249 (1936). See also Miller, "The 'Capital
Asset' Concept," 59 Yale L. J. 369 (1950), particularly pp. 854, 885 and 1083.
The definition appears to have originated with Noah Webster.
1 L. R. 15 Chan. 247 (1880). See also Buckley, The Companies Act, 12th Ed.
pp. 763-4.
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word of extensive use and indefinite signification. . . There
are many things which in common colloquial English would
not be called a business, even when carried on by a single
person, which would be so called when carried on by a
number of persons. . . . The same observation may be made
as regards a single individual buying or selling land, with
this addition, that he may make it a business and then it is
a question of continuity. A man occasionally buys and sells
land, as many landowners do, and nobody would say that
he was a land-jobber or dealer in land, but if a man made
it his particular business to buy and sell land to obtain a
profit, he would be designated as a land-jobber or dealer
in land. . . [I]nasmuch as the legislature could not par-
ticularize every kind of business which they intended to
include, they have, in order to confine the meaning of that
large word "business," stated that it is to be a business that
"has for its object the acquisition of gain."' 9
Obviously, the acts of the individual are the best evidence
of his intention to engage in business and the purpose for so
doing. With reference to the subdivision business, however, the
determination of intention would appear to involve two types
of conditions, those precedent and those subsequent. After evi-
dence of the purpose of acquisition has ben introduced, the factor
of frequency and continuity of sales would be in the nature of
a condition precedent for it would distinguish business from an
isolated or an occasional transaction. 0 Similarly, the showing
of a profit purpose would evidence an intention to engage in busi-
ness, hence would tend to establish the existence of a business.
In the average subdivision project there is both a pre-existing
intention to engage in frequent and continuous sales and also a
purpose to derive profit therefrom so it is hardly necessary to
engage in an extended process of induction calling for the
evaluation of a multiplicity of factors, the deduction being one
19 L. R. 15 Chan. 247 at 258-60 and 278.
20 It might be noted that sales of separate parcels would evidence a profit
purpose if made with sufficient frequency and continuity.
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
which can be quickly drawn from the extent of the taxpayer's
participation therein.21 Nevertheless, the general profit purpose
is only prima facie evidence and it may be rebutted by what might
be called conditions subsequent. As the various factors men-
tioned by the courts when considered in their entirety are thus
relevant to the extent of the participation, it follows that, if the
extent of the participation is inadequate, this fact would operate
to defeat the pre-existing intention and would operate in the
nature of a condition subsequent.
The impression has been given that the personal participation
of the individual in the activities of the business would be neces-
sary for, as one court put it, business is "busyness." 22 While
this may be true for some commercial activities, the job involved
in subdividing and selling land is usually a major undertaking
which calls for the services of others in some or all of its phases.
As it is a business which may be managed or carried on by an
agent, it would seem that personal participation by the owner
would be unnecessary so long as he is responsible as principal.
Participation, therefore, should be understood in terms of trans-
actions for which the owner would be legally responsible. Closely
related is the idea that, in order to be engaged in business, the
individual must be exclusively engaged therein. If there were
such a requirement, it could be said that the lot sales from many
large-scale subdivision projects would escape taxation as ordi-
nary business income. It is doubtful that this is the law and, in
a case under another section of the Code, it was stated: "No-
where has it been . . . said that the man engaged in trade or
business must give his habitual or principal attention to the
occupation or employment.'23
By way of illustrating these points, attention is directed to
the case of Phipps v. Commissioner,4 the first of the cases in
21 In the case of Ethel M. Hauk, 10 TCM 925 (1951), the Tax Court said that
the "extent of the taxpayer's activity with or concerning the subject matter is
the predominating test."
22 Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 891 at 892 (1938).
23 See the opinion of Manton, C. J., in Mente v. Eisner, 266 F. 161 at 164 (1920).
24 54 F. (2d) 469 (1931).
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which application of this section was attempted to a subdivision
project conducted by an individual who was not otherwise actu-
ally engaged in the real estate business. The Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit there held that the individuals
were not engaged in the real estate business but, in the "wisdom
of retrospect," and in the light of subsequent decisions, the court
appears to have decided erroneously on every point involved.
2 5
The Phipps family there concerned possessed vast wealth, most
of which was invested in real estate located in various parts of
the United States and owned and managed by a family corpo-
ration. The petitioners, apart from the activities of their cor-
poration, had individually purchased several tracts of Florida
land, one of which had been subdivided into seventy-one lots.
After title had been taken in the name of an agent, the tract was
surveyed, cleared, plotted, ornamented with trees, and furnished
with roads, water, sewers, and electric lights. In the seven years
preceding the two taxable years in question, approximately 76%
of the lots had been sold at an approximate gross sales price of
$337,800. For the two taxable years, gross sales 26 were $105,700
and $84,300 respectively. It was the opinion of the Board of Tax
Appeals that the subdivision was a joint venture and that "the
petitioners were dealers as well as investors in real estate."
'27
On further review, the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
this decision, basing its opinion on the fact that the real estate
transactions which occurred were too limited and the sales were
not sufficiently frequent. In that connection, the court said:
There should be a greater continuity and a larger absorption
of time in such transactions to make the taxpayers more
than investors. . . . [N]othing was done . . . but to hold
land for sale . . . and to accept such offers . . . as were
presented by brokers and seemed satisfactory. There was
25 While the Phipps case has not been expressly reversed, the holding In the case
of Richards v. Commissioner, 81 F. (2d) 369, 106 A. L. R. 249 (1936), and in
subsequent decisions, would appear to indicate an implied reversal.
26No sales office was maintained, all sales apparently originating through
independent real estate brokers who operated in the vicinity of the property.
27 See 19 BTA 1293 at 1297.
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. .. no activity amounting to a trade or business.
[W]hether there was such a . . .business depended on the
situation of the taxpayers at the time of sale. They had
not continuously engaged in the development and sale, or
the purchase and sale of land.
28
Without doubt the court considered all of the elements involved
but, in the light of subsequent decisions, not only improperly
evaluated all of them but also disregarded the holding in Mente
v. Eisner,2 a case which had been decided in the same circuit
some eleven years previously, wherein it was held that a man did
not have to give his habitual or principal attention to his occu-
pation or employment.
B. INTENT TO DO SUBDIVISION BUSINESS
The extent of the participation of the individual in a defined
and particular business, that of subdividing and selling land or
in purchasing and selling separate parcels, being evidence of
his intention to engage in business, hence evidence of such busi-
ness, it would be desirable to give first consideration to the factor
of frequency and continuity of sales. Before this can be done,
however, it is necessary to find answers to two subordinate ques-
tions, i. e., the frequency and continuity of what sales and in
what way are the elements of time and quantity involved?
Using the language previously quoted from the case of
Smith v. Anderson, a business exists when an individual carries
on a series of acts "having the acquisition of gain for their
object. ' ' 81 In the case of sales of separate parcels, otherwise
unrelated transactions become related by means of the profit
purpose, the cumulative effect of such sales or the frequency
and continuity of taking profits indicating the intention to engage
in business. In contrast, again where separate parcels are
involved, a prolonged holding period by the taxpayer would
28 54 F. (2d) 469 at 471.
29 266 F. 161 (1920).
80 L. R. 15 Chan. 247 at 278 (1880).
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indicate an insufficient frequency and continuity to amount to
"active current trading," so the asset would be considered as
being held in the investment classification."
But, in the case of subdivisions, the length of the holding
period prior to sale cannot defeat the pre-existing profit purpose
nor the existence of the business which it evidences. A subdivi-
sion being a single venture for the purpose of profit, the court
in the Phipps case was in error in attempting to isolate the sales
for particular taxable years for the purpose of determining the
existence of a business in each and every year. If this were to be
permitted, the taxpayer might be considered as engaging in
business in all of the years, in none of them, or in some years
but not in others. Since the profit purpose is the essential ele-
ment, the quantitative aspects of any given subdivision project
should be immaterial.
This fact is borne out by the cases. They do not specify
that a subdivision must comprise a specified number of lots, or
acres, or dollar volume of sales and, with the exception of the
Phipps case in which it was held that profits of approximately
$42,000 in each of two consecutive years indicated sales 'too
limited to amount to a business in real estate,"8 2 the question
of the sufficiency of the financial magnitude of sales has not
arisen in any subdivision case." It is true that most of the cases
which have reached the Tax Court have involved subdivisions
on a major scale, but even in the small-scale subdivision cases
no issue of quantum or magnitude has been raised. Thus, in the
case entitled Amelie M. Staff, 4 the taxpayer was held to be en-
gaged in the business of subdividing and selling real estate when
she subdivided eight acres into twenty-six lots, about fifteen of
31 Harriss v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d) 279 (1944) ; James L. Vaughan, 7 TCM
288 (1948).
32 Phipps v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 469 at 470 (1931).
33 Austin v. United States, 116 F. Supp. 283 (1953). On the basis of the
explanations there provided, the continuous sales of substantial values in real
estate lose much of their normal force as an indication of real estate activity.
34 3 TCM 1145 (1944).
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which were sold over a ten-year period, despite the remark that
the operations of the petitioner "were not extensive.'"
The fact that the taxpayer, a real estate dealer, has engaged
exclusively in the real estate business is evidence of his profit
purpose, hence the frequency and continuity rule would be im-
material with respect to him. 6 It should be noted, however, that
if the rule has no application to the business as a whole, it has
no application to any component activity thereof, so it cannot
be used for the purpose of determining the accounting or balance
sheet classification of any land which he may hold as a dealer.
Thus, in the case of Charles H. Black, Sr.,3' an attempt by the
Commissioner to classify the purpose of holding of various par-
cels of land by a real estate dealer on the basis of the frequency
and continuity rule was rejected and the fact that most of the
dealer's sales were of residential property was not considered
material. However, the frequency and continuity rule is appli-
cable to sales made by a dealer on his own account apart from
the sales made in the course of his business.3
8
What is the inference to be drawn as to the purpose of holding
when the frequency and continuity of sales ceases for a long
period of years, or when there is a prolonged holding period? The
answer might depend on whether the person is a dealer or an indi-
vidual and whether the prolonged holding is the product of his
voluntary act. In the case of an individual not otherwise engaged
in the real estate business, a prolonged holding period would be
evidence that the land was held in the investment classification
for, to evidence the profit purpose necessary to the existence of
35 3 TOM 1145 at 1150.
36 Lobelle v. Dunlap, 210 F. (2d) 465 (1954); Martin v. United States, 119 F.
Supp. 468 (1954).
3745 BTA 204 (1941). See also Weyman Willingham, 12 TCM 584 (1953).
38 Eddy D. Field, 8 TCM 170 (1949), affirmed in a per curiam opinion in 180
F. (2d) 170 (1950). See also Robert C. Symonds, 10 TCM 721 (1951); Dan D.
Jones, 10 TCM 781 (1951) ; Helga Carlen, sub. nom. McKay v. Bowers, 20 TO 573
(1953). The House Committee Report on the Internal Revenue Code of 1954
included a proposed Section 1237 designed to permit dealers to hold real estate
for investment in a separate account: U. S. Code Cong. and Admin. News, No. 5,
April 5, 19.54, p. 962. The Senate Committee deleted this provision: ibid., No. 12,
July 5, 1954, p. 2745.
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a business, there must be a sufficient frequency and continuity of
sales. In the case of a dealer, as to whom no such profit purpose
must be established, the answer would depend upon whether the
holding was the consequence of his voluntary act. Thus, in the
ease of Walter G. Morley, 9 the petitioner had carried on real
estate operations for gain for many years prior to 1931. After
1931, his purchases and sales virtually ceased, but the court said
it was "not convinced that he abandoned his business of selling
real estate." It noted that the taxpayer's activity "was not
restricted or halted by reason of any change in his plans or
purpose, but rather by the force of economic circumstances beyond
his control and not of his making. The general business depression
of the past decade was the reason for the curtailment of peti-
tioner 's activity."4 It might be noted that this rule has been
applied to real estate dealers who have engaged in subdivision
projects 41 as well as to dealers in separate parcels.
4 2
C. IN BUSINESS OR IN LIQUIDATION?
It has been pointed out that, in the first instance, asset classi-
fication is to be determined by the purpose of acquisition. Occa-
sionally, the circumstances of acquisition may conclusively es-
tablish the purpose thereof, as was true in the case of George
W. Wibbelsma 4 3 wherein it was held that the syndicate agreement
established that the land was held in the "for sale" classifica-
tion. The taxpayer there, in order to acquire a certain tract
desired for subdivision, had been obliged to purchase seventeen
additional sites of an undesirable nature. The agreement pro-
vided that the lands were to be sold as a whole, either in sep-
arate parcels or as subdivided land, the "sole purpose of the ven-
ture being to buy and sell lands for a profit,-not to hold them
for investment." 44 The classification of the various tracts being
39 8 TC 904 (1947).
40 8 TC 904 at 915-6.
41 Harry F. Payer, 5 TCM 917 (1946); Julius Goodman, 40 BTA 22 (1939).
42 Jay Burns, 21 TC-(No. 100, 1954) ; Walter G. Morley, 8 TC 904 (1947).
43 12 TO 1022 (1949). See also Friend v. Commissioner, 198 F. (2d) 285 (1952).
44 12 TC 1022 at 1026.
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governed by an indivisible contract directed toward the accom-
plishment of a single purpose, the only way in which a change in
asset classification could have occurred would have been by a
change in the contract itself, namely, by a novation. Since a no-
vation did not appear, the purpose so established was both prima
facie and conclusive evidence on the point.
Asset classification, established by the purpose of acquisition,
being no more than prima facie evidence, the presumption may
be rebutted by circumstances in effect or controlling at the time
of disposition. For example, even though the purpose of ac-
quisition supported an initial classification as an investment or
fixed asset, this original purpose may have to yield if the owner
should later engage in a business in which the asset is there-
after held in the "for sale" classification. In that connection,
an owner may desire to liquidate an investment or fixed asset.
Is it possible for him to do this without engaging in business?
Since liquidation may include business, the distinction between
business and liquidation must be made in terms of purpose. The
ultimate respective purposes are divergent. Liquidation looks
toward the termination of the particular business, trust or fund,
profit not being the primary object or purpose. Business, on the
other hand, envisages creation, a continuous expanding growth,
with profit the primary and essential purpose without which
growth could not occur.
The contention was made, in all of the cases discussed here-
after under this topic, that the owner was engaged in liquida-
tion rather than business. In the Richards, Ehrman and Snell
cases, the contention was apparently based on the Phipps case.
These cases, however, rejected the holding of the Phipps case
and established the point that engaging in a subdivision project
is engaging in a business, thereby rebutting the purpose of holding
which had been established prior thereto. Since the normal rea-
son for engaging in a subdivision project would be because of
the profit purpose, it could hardly be claimed that the project
was no more than a vehicle for liquidation. Nevertheless, the
method by which the sales were made would become important
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in determining whether the purpose was or was not one for
profit. If the land was subdivided subsequent to acquisition, the
conduct of the subdivision and the solicitation of sales would
evidence a profit purpose. If, in contrast, the land had been
subdivided prior to acquisition, and the lots were sold without
active solicitation by the taxpayer, evidence of a profit purpose
would probably be lacking, hence the circumstance of acquisition
would establish the asset classification rather than the circum-
stances existing at the time of disposition.
1. Subdivision After Acquisition.
On the first of these points, it could be said that the leading
case with respect to the tax consequences attendant upon sub-
division after acquisition is the case of Richards v. Commis-
sioner.4 5 The petitioner there had purchased lands near Los An-
geles which he used for truck gardening purposes. The subdi-
vision of adjacent property caused his property to increase in
value to such an extent that it became unprofitable to continue
to use the land as a truck garden, so petitioner determined to
subdivide a portion of the property. For this purpose, he con-
veyed to a corporate trustee not only to secure his note but also
upon the further trust to subdivide and sell the property con-
veyed, the trust deed appointing an exclusive agent to subdivide,
improve and sell. Petitioner took no active part in the subdivi-
sion or sale of the lots and, while conceding that he held the
property primarily for sale, he urged that it was not held for
sale in the course of his business because the planned disposi-
tion really constituted a liquidation. The Board of Tax Appeals
denied this contention by pointing out that the petitioner had not
liquidated his business of farming, but rather had enlarged it
by the lease or purchase of other properties. What he had done
was to take certain assets individually owned and devote them to
a new purpose.46 The Circuit Court of Appeals concurred, say-
45 81 F. (2d) 369, 106 A. L. R. 249 (1936). See also Chandler v. U. S., 121 F.
Supp. 722 (1954).
46 30 BTA 1131 at 1135 (1934).
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ing that it was quite obvious that the reason the petitioner had
subdivided the land for sale was to obtain a larger profit.
Similarly, in the case of Ehrman v. Commissioner,47 the ini-
tial intention was not to engage in a subdivision project but,
when faced with the alternative of selling as a single tract or
subdividing, the actual conduct of the project became dominated
by the profit motive. Having elected to change his intention, the
taxpayer was unable to rely on the circumstance of acquisition as
a basis for the claim of liquidation. In that case, the taxpayer and
other heirs had inherited a ranch worth about four million dollars.
The heirs were opposed to a subdivision project so they sold the
ranch outright to a corporation in a single transaction with a
down payment of $250,000 and with the balance payable over a
ten-year period. The corporation subdivided the property but,
upon its default, the property was reacquired by the taxpayer
and the other heirs in the form of a subdivision. Upon advice,
the heirs employed a selling corporation to carry on the work
of the subdivision but asserted they were engaged in a liquida-
tion of the property because they had been forced into the posi-
tion "by reason of the condition of the property when it was
reacquired by them" after the default. The Court of Appeals,
nevertheless, relying on the Richards case, held the heirs were
engaged in business.
48
The question has also arisen as to whether a real estate man
could be said to be liquidating his business because he had not
continuously engaged therein nor was vigorously promoting it
to the maximum extent possible. Since the taxpayer in Snell v.
Commissioner4 9 had been exclusively engaged in the real estate
4741 BTA 652 (1940), affirmed In 120 F. (2d) 607 (1941), cert. den. 314 U. S.
668, 62 S. Ct. 129, 86 L. Ed. 534 (1941). See also Shearer v. Smyth, 116 F. Supp.
230 (1953).
48 The Board of Tax Appeals had clearly stated the profit purpose when it said :
"We are not convinced that a sale as acreage, as Investment property, without
going into business with it would have been disastrous, but rather, on the con-
trary, that it could have been so sold in some reasonable transaction. A better
financial result, and not necessity, thus appears as the reason for carrying on with
the subdivision." See 41 BTA 653 at 663.
4997 F. (2d) 891 (1938). See also Estate of Wilson Critzer, CCH 20,691M,
TCM 1954-211.
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business, it would appear to have been unnecessary to find that
he had continuously engaged therein. Even so, his claim that
he was liquidating his business was not well substantiated when
it appeared that he was one of the largest real estate operators
in the vicinity and had made sales of approximately $1,803,000
for the four taxable years in question. The fact that he had pur-
chased no additional land was a circumstance of minor signifi-
cance when compared to the large-scale nature of his operations
which involved sufficient promotional and developmental activity
to preclude the inference of an intention to liquidate. 50
Apparently, both from an analogy drawn from the law of
trusts and from the interpretation given by the courts to the
provisions of the Code pertaining to the taxation of trusts as
associations, 51 an attempt has been made to claim that liquidation
rather than business was the principal motive when land sales
were passively made. The nature of the sales, whether active
or passive, however, should be considered in connection with the
owner's intention to engage in a subdivision project for the fact
that the taxpayer was able to make sales without active promo-
tion should not be deemed to be a circumstance of controlling
significance if the taxpayer has a clear intention to engage in
such a project. In Oliver v. Commissioner," for example, the
petitioner found that his property was in demand because of
its proximity to the nation's capital. He surveyed and sub-
divided the tract and improved the property with streets and
drainage. The only advertising he did was to erect a "for sale"
GO In that connection, the court said: "The word ... business . . . implies that
. .. the activity is an occupation. It need not be one's sole occupation, nor take
all his time. It may be only seasonal, and not active the year round. It ordinarily
is implied that one's own attention and effort is involved, but the maxim qui facit
per alium facit per se applies, and one may carry on a business through agents
whom he supervises. The present taxpayer therefore does not demonstrate that
he was not engaged in business because he also rented his buildings and operated
a golf course; nor because he was usually absent from Florida for five months in
the year when there was no business activity in St. Petersburg; nor because he
made most of his sales through brokers as his agents." 97 F. (2d) 891 at 892-3.
51 See Dean, "Federal Taxation of Trusts as Associations," 14 Temp. L. Q. 333
(1940).
52 138 F. (2d) 910 (1943). See also Mauldin v. Commissioner, 195 F. (2d) 714
(1952); Ralph A. Horton, TCM (CCII Dec. 20,573M, 1954), and the companion
case of Julian E. Ross, TCM (CCH Dec. 20,615M, 1954). Contra: Daniel W. Ellis,
TCM (CCH Dec. 20,106M, 1954).
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sign. He did not employ solicitors, personally taking prospective
buyers on tours of inspection. The court denied his contention
that he was merely liquidating a capital asset.
Likewise, in the case of Lizzie May Jackson,53 the taxpayer's
intention to engage in a subdivision project could be inferred
from the surveying and platting of the property into lots and
the preparation of deeds and abstracts of title so that she could
transfer title to any lot without difficulty, all done in accordance
with the advice of her attorney. The passive nature of the
several items of the taxpayer's conduct in not making any im-
provements, or putting up of "for sale" signs, or listing the
lots with real estate agents, or holding herself out to the public
as being in the real estate business in that she had no office
or license, were all held to be immaterial.3
While, in the two cases last mentioned, there was evi-
dence of an intention to engage in a subdivision project, the
case of R. H. Hutchinson" indicates that there may be times
when no such intention exists and that passive sales could be
made in a manner to demonstrate an attendant circumstance of
liquidation. The petitioner there, in order to acquire a site for
his factory at an advantageous price, had been obliged to pur-
chase an eight-acre tract which he platted into thirty-seven lots.
Twenty-one of these lots he reserved for the factory site and
he planned to dispose of the remainder. Since the site selected
was principally suitable for factory uses, the property presented
limited opportunity, if any, for residential development or use
and the excess property had only a salvage value at best.
Limited improvements were put in, primarily for the benefit of
the factory. The taxpayer did not advertise, all sales resulting
from approaches made by prospective purchasers. The small-
53 5 TCM 271 (1946).
54 The taxpayer was held to have been engaged in the real estate business when,
over a seven-year period, she sold 32 lots at a gross selling price of $32,720 to
purchasers who sought her out: 5 TCM 271 at 272.
55 8 TCM 597 (1949). See also Wells V. Kelm, 52-2 USTC 1947: W. T. Thrift,
Sr., 15 TC 366 (1950) ; Maudine Neese, 12 TCM 1058 (1953) Nathan Schwartz,
10 TCM 400 (1945) ; Barber v. Edwards, Adm'r, 55-5 CCH f1 9329.
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scale nature of the operation, the limited developmental activity,
and the fact that nothing was done to evidence the conduct of
a subdivision project or to engage therein was enough to defeat
the usual conclusion which would have treated the income as
being ordinary income.
2. Subdivision Before Acquisition
The remaining cases which have bearing on the tax liability
of the owner of a subdivision are those in which the property
was subdivided prior to acquisition. In these cases, the fact
of subdivision was considered relevant to an intention to engage
in a subdivision project only if the land was acquired for that
purpose or was actually so used even though not acquired for
such purpose. In contrast, the fact of subdivision has been held
to be irrelevant to the purpose of acquisition in those cases dis-
cussed hereafter in which it was shown that the acquisition
came by way of inheritance, by foreclosure, or to protect liens.
Since, in a subdivision project, the subdividing of the land, its
development, and the sale thereof are related, with the principal
and only purpose being that of disposition at a profit, it follows
that, in the last mentioned instances, provided there is no develop-
ment or improvement of the tract and the sales are passive, the re-
sulting disposition of the lots cannot be said to resemble the sub-
division business but are really an attendant circumstance upon
a liquidation.5 6 Evidence disclosing a solicitation of sales, how-
ever, would give rise to the inference that the owner has engaged
in a subdivision project even though the land had not been ac-
quired for that purpose.
In White v. Commissioner,7 for example, the petitioner
acquired a number of different subdivisions in 1930 in order to
protect sizable, liens thereon for paving and other work done.
No sales of lots took place for several years because of the
depression. Following acquisition, some houses were constructed
56 Ethel M. Hank, 10 TCM 925 (1951); Dagmar Gruy, 9 TOM 235 (1950);
Ashton C. Jones, Jr., 1 TCM 816 (1943).
57172 F. (2d) 629 (1949). See also Beatrice Brenneman, 11 TCM 628 (1952).
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on parts of the property, which represented the only improve-
ments of any kind made by petitioner. Sales resulted from
offers made by the public at the office of the petitioner's paving
business and, for the years in question, a profit accrued from
such sales. The petitioner claimed that he had been forced to
acquire the properties to protect liens and to collect what was
due for work done in relation to the paving business, so the
sales constituted no more than a liquidation of an investment.
Despite this, the court, relying on the frequency and continuity
rule, was of the opinion that the number of lots sold, the con-
sideration received, and the profits realized revealed that the
sales were not casual but rather indicated a frequency, a con-
tinuity, and a volume characteristic of one engaged in the real
estate business on a rather substantial scale. No intention to
engaged in a subdivision project could be inferred from the pur-
pose of acquisition, for the expressed purpose was to protect
the liens. The actual use made of the land, as indicated by the
frequency and continuity of sales, however, did operate to estab-
lish the necessary intention. Moreover, the sales were not
passively made but were solicited. Since solicitation may be
either direct or indirect, the court also regarded the construction
of the houses as an indirect form of solicitation which, when
added to the frequency and continuity of sales, served to indi-
cate an intention to engage in, or at least to complete, a subdi-
vision project.
The facts in the case of Guthrie v. Jones5" were slightly
different in that the taxpayer, engaged in the loan and invest-
ment business, had acquired a subdivided addition to a city by
the process of foreclosure. While the opinion in the case does
not disclose the total number of lots in the subdivision, some 213
lots were sold in a three-year period with 84 sales falling in
the taxable years. The lots were sold in the condition in which
they had been acquired, no improvement having been made. The
taxpayer did not directly solicit or promote these sales as the
58 72 F. Supp. 784 (1947). See also Brodsky, "Houses Originally Built for Invest-
ment," N. Y. U. Twelfth Ann. Inst. on Fed. Taxation, p. 109.
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purchasers either sought him out or were brought in by an
independent real estate salesman who had been permitted by
the taxpayer to maintain an office on the premises. The sales-
man was not subject to supervision. The District Court was
of the opinion that the taxpayer had not engaged in business,
stating: "The sale of the lots . . . was made to regain the amount
of the loan; . . . the sales were irregular and lacking in con-
tinuity for over eight years; the bulk [having been] due to the
growth of the community and the change of economic condi-
tions.'"' After an appeal had been docketed in the Circuit
Court of Appeals,"0 the case was dismissed on a stipulation of
the parties. The lower court's decision is a questionable one
for, by permitting an independent salesman to maintain an office
at the subdivision, the taxpayer was holding out to the public
the fact that the lots were for sale, was extending an implied
invitation to the public to make offers, and was, in effect, indi-
rectly soliciting such offers.
Contrast is provided by the case of Frieda E. J. Farley61
The petitioner there had purchased a tract of unimproved
pasture land near the outskirts of a city and had, for a long
period of years, used the property for a nursery. Prior to this
purchase, the tract had been platted and divided into numbered
lots and streets delineated officially on a map of record in the
appropriate public office. Subsequent to acquisition, the city
improved certain of the streets but no improvements which had
any relation to a subdivision project or which were designed to
enhance residential occupancy had been made by the taxpayer.
Because of restrictive covenants in the deed, petitioner had been
unable to erect fences to protect the nursery from encroachment.
Eventually, when approached by friends, the taxpayer sold
twenty-five of the 175 lots in the tract. The taxpayer did not
engage in any activity whatsoever to promote these sales, did no
advertising, hired no agents, did not list the property nor erect
59 72 F. Supp. 784 at 785-6.
60 See 163 F. (2d) 1018 (1947).
617 TC 198 (1946). See also Thomas E. Wood, 16 TC 213 (1951).
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any signs. The Tax Court, noting that the taxpayer "could
have maintained a more passive role only by refusing to sell at
all,"' 62 reached the conclusion that the taxpayer was engaged
in liquidation and not in business. As the property had been
subdivided prior to acquisition and had not been purchased or
used for a subdivision project, any intention on the point neces-
sarily had to be inferred from the circumstances of sale. The
sales occurred in one taxable year and no mention was made
as to the manner of disposition, if any, of the remainder of the
lots. The question could well be raised, therefore, whether an
intention to engage in a subdivision project could be said to
exist in the event the remainder of the lots were sold in subse-
quent years.
The one remaining case, that entitled Estate of Alice
Kleberg, deceased,s8 involved a situation wherein property which
had already been subdivided had been acquired from the estate
of the taxpayer's deceased husband when, in the course of the
administration of the husband's estate, the executrix had been
obliged to discharge his liability on the note of a certain land
company in which he had been a stockholder. The executrix
paid one-half of the liability and the balance was paid by another
member of the family who was also an endorser. In return,
the entire assets of the land company were turned over to the
endorsers and the executrix acquired the outstanding interest
in the land upon payment of half of the stipulated value to
the other endorser. No improvements were made and the lots
were never advertised for sale. Such sales as were made occurred
when someone desiring to buy a lot would make a bid, with the
bidder being told that the lots were not for sale in the event
the bid was too low. No commissions were paid or received
by anyone connected with these sales. The only act performed
by the taxpayer in relation to the real estate, other than paying
the taxes thereon, was to sign a deed whenever a sale was
62 7 TC 198 at 203.
635 TCM 858 (1946). See also Shearer v. Smyth, 116 F. Supp. 230 (1953);
Martin Dressin, 17 TC 1443 (1952); Estate of W. D. Haden, deceased, 12 TCM 825
(1953).
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made. It should occasion no surprise, therefore, to learn that
the Tax Court held that the income from these sales was to
be taxed only as a long-term capital gain.
D. DOING BUSINESS THROUGH OTHERS
The owner of land in no way alters his tax liability if he
refrains from personally operating the subdivision business and
leaves the conduct thereof to his agents6" or to trustees 5 for,
as noted above, the question is not one which requires that
the taxpayer give his exclusive or even his personal attention to
the activity.6 Whether the relationship of principal and agent
exists depends, of course, upon the degree of control over the
transactions retained by the owner of the land 7 and, if sufficient
control is retained, an agency exists even though the contract
between the parties provides for the shifting of a major part
of the cost of development and sales activity to another.8
In the event the taxpayer chooses to use a trust device, he
should remember that a trustee may engage in a subdivision
project either pursuant to an express power69 or by reason of
an implied power needed to accomplish the purposes of the trust.
70
If the power has been expressly stated, the settlor-beneficiary
will not be permitted to claim that the income is not ordinary
business income or that the acts of the trustee are unrelated to
the purposes expressed simply because the trustee could dispose
64 Snell v. Commissioner, 97 F. (2d) 891 (1938).
65 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, Vol. 2, § 250. In Richards v. Commissioner, 81 F.
(2d) 369, 106 A. L. R. 249 (1936), the trustee employed an agent to subdivide and
sell the land.
66 See notes 22 to 29, ante.
67 Fahs v. Crawford, 161 F. (2d) 315 (1947) ; Boomhower v. United States, 74 F.
Supp. 997 (1947) ; Martin v. United States, 128 F. Supp. 576 (1954).
68 Brown v. Commissioner, 143 F. (2d) 468 (1944); W. D. Haden, 2 TCM 1029
(1943) ; Rosalie H. Bosworth, 2 TCM 773 (1943).
69 Bogert, op. cit., Vol. 2, § 250. See also Sections 267 and 307, and Vol. 3, Part 1,
§ 551. Compare with Welch v. Solomon, 99 F. (2d) 41 (1938), and Richards v.
Commissioner, 81 F. (2d) 369, 106 A. L. R. 249 (1936).
70 If reliance is placed on the implied powers of the trustee, the intention as to
the holding must be determined from the acts of the trustee rather than from the
terms of the trust instrument, in the event the instrument fails to designate
the purpose of holding or is not introduced in evidence: William R. Watson, 6
TCM 772 (1947) ; W. N. Foster, 2 TCM 595 (1943).
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of the land in his uncontrolled discretion.7 ' When, however, the
power to engage in a subdivision project is merely incidental
to the principal purpose of the trust, it will be deemed to be with-
out significance particularly when only a small percentage of
the total number of lots has been sold and, in effect, the power
has not been exercised.72
E. CORPORATE HELD LANDS
1. Business Corporations.
As the basic purpose of every business corporation is to
make a profit, the asset classification to be given to land held
by corporations, even for income tax purposes, will be deter-
mined by the law relating to corporations and not by the Internal
Revenue Code.7" In that connection, it must be noted that land
may be acquired pursuant to an express power contained in the
corporate charter, under an implied power, or as the result of
an ultra vires transaction. In much the same way, the asset
classification to be given to land, whether held for sale, for
investment, or as a fixed asset, will be dependent upon the power
pursuant to which it is acquired. The power to "buy, sell and
deal in land," that is to hold it in the "for sale" classification,
must usually be expressly authorized by the charter, either as
the principal or at least a fundamental purpose of the corpo-
ration, 74 but every corporation has an implied, if not an express,
power to "own such real property as is reasonable necessary"
to the corporate business and purposes. 75  Land of this char-
acter, including the buildings thereon, would be placed in the
71 Thornton v. United States, 53-2 USTC 9536 (1953).
72 Helen Schwerin Trust, 13 TCM -, CCH Dec. 20,203M (1954).
73 See Bartlett, "The Impact of State Law on Federal Income Taxation," 25
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REv Ew 103 (1947), particularly pp. 106-13.
74 Fletcher, Corporations, Vol. 6A, § 2804, and Vol. 1, § 96, pp. 335-8. See also
Palos Verdes Corp. v. United States, 201 F. (2d) 256 (1952) ; Spanish Trail Land
Co., 10 TC 430 (1948). It should be noted that land may be acquired pursuant to
implied power, even though the corporation possesses an express power to engage
in the real estate business, if in fact the acquisition was not pursuant to the
express power.
75 Fletcher, op. cit., Vol. 6A, §§ 2789 and 2796.
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fixed asset classification. Corporations also have an implied
power to acquire land, as a proper incident to the conduct of
authorized principal transactions, in the event it is necessary
to do so in order to secure satisfaction of debts due them. 
7
Such land would be classified as an investment and the corpo-
ration might well be placed under a duty to dispose of it at the
earliest practicable time.77 Land acquired as a result of an
ultra vires transaction has also been held to fall in the invest-
ment classification.
78
The foregoing propositions as to corporate held lands could
well have bearing on the matter of tax liability. In addition,
while courts have discussed the matter of frequency and con-
tinuity of sales in the corporation cases, it should be kept clearly
in mind that, this rule being merely a rule of evidence, it is
relevant only on the question of the exercise of an existing power
and does not go to the existence of the power itself.
79
The tax consequences attendant upon corporate land holding
may be illustrated by a few cases. In the one entitled Thompson
Lumber Company,"0 the land represented security for unpaid
accounts and was acquired by foreclosure and by voluntary
conveyance. The unpaid accounts arose from the conduct of the
principal business, that of furnishing lumber and building mate-
rial. While the corporate charter authorized the company to
engage in the real estate business, it did not appear that it was
so engaged or that the land was acquired pursuant to such power.
When this land was sold at a loss, a question arose as to whether
a deduction could be taken in the full amount or only as to a
part thereof. It was held that the taxpayer, despite its charter,
was not engaged in the real estate business, hence the extent of
the deductible loss with respect to these capital assets was
limited.
76 Thompson Lumber Co., 43 BTA 726 (1941).
77 Three States Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 158 F. (2d) 61 (1946). See also
Fletcher, op. cit., Vol. 6A, §§ 2789 and 2802.
78 Dunlap v. Oldham Lumber Co., 178 F. (2d) 781 (1950).
79 Section 1237 of the 1954 Code Is apparently intended to indicate this.
8043 BTA 726 (1941).
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In another case, that of Wineman Realty Company,"' the
corporation was engaged in the business of renting improved
properties which it either acquired or constructed. In twenty
years, only three of the properties had been sold because un-
profitable from a rental standpoint. The building concerned
in the tax dispute had been constructed for rental to a merchan-
dising chain and was finally sold to that company at a loss. While
the taxpayer possessed a charter power to "purchase, hold and
deal in real estate," the property in question was neither
acquired or disposed of pursuant to such power but represented
a unique type of transaction on the taxpayer's part. It was
decided that, under these unique circumstances, the property was
held apart from any aspect of the ordinary course of the busi-
ness.
Even though a corporation would have implied power to
acquire land as an incident to its authorized transactions, sub-
ject to the obligation to dispose of the same within a reasonable
time, the corporation involved in the case entitled Thompson
Yards, Incorporated,s2 enjoyed an express power to this effect.
Under the circumstances, it was not difficult to uphold a conten-
tion that land of this character fell into the investment or capital
asset type. In Dunlap v. Oldham Lumber Company, 3 however,
the charter of the corporation restricted its power to "buying
and sale of lumber, building materials, coal and agricultural
products of any description." Contrary to this charter power,
fifty lots in a platted and approved subdivision, improved only
by streets, were acquired with the probable thought in mind of
selling the same to customers who would purchase lumber and
the like with which to erect houses thereon. The lots were dis-
posed of irregularly over a period of eighteen years and the
sales were not made as a part of and did not forward in any
way the principal authorized lumber business. The ultra vires
81 1 TCM 791 (1943). See also Houston Deep Water Land Co. v. Schofield, 110 F.
Supp. 394 (1952); South Texas Properties Co., 16 TC 1003 (1951).
82 1 TCM 822 (1943).
83178 F. (2d) 781 (1950).
TAX STATUS OF SUBDIVISIONS
manner of acquisition and the method of disposition of these
lots also resulted in their inclusion in the investment classifi-
cation.
2. Specialized Corporations
Unlike the principles which control with respect to ordinary
business corporations, the asset classification to be given to
land held by certain specialized corporations, such as insurance
companies, railroads, banks and trust companies, would be likely
to be governed by the charter powers thereof or be open to
special statutory regulation. Banks, for example, may hold real
estate only in accordance with those purposes enumerated
in the state banking laws or the National Bank Act.8 4 If the
real estate is acquired as a site for the bank's place of business,
such real estate becomes a fixed asset. When acquired in the
course of securing satisfaction for debts due, the bank is usually
under a limitation with respect to the period during which such
land may be held.85 Whether this land can be held in the "for
sale" classification would be dependent upon the power of the
bank to engage in the real estate business under state law.88
As most banks lack such authority, the classification would
normally be governed by the nature of the property rather than
by the method of acquisition. The Commissioner, for example,
has attempted to have land acquired by banks pursuant to fore-
closure excluded from capital assets but, as long as he has ad-
vanced the contention that such land was held for sale to
customers, he has been unsuccessful.8 7  The Tax Court has,
however, sustained a General Counsel's Memorandum which
directs that "productive" real property, i. e., rented property,
should be considered as used in the trade or business of the
lending institution 8 and, in accordance therewith, this sort of
84 Fletcher, op. cit., Vol. 6A, §§ 2806-7.
85 See, for example, Il. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 161/, § 9, which places a
five-year limitation period on the right to hold land acquired in this fashion.
86 Harr v. McLaughlin, 15 F. Supp. 1004 (1936); Kanawha Valley Bank, 4 TC
252 (1944).
87 GCM 2, 1947-2 CB 187 (1939) ; GCM 24910-1 CB 28 (1946) ; Kanawha Valley
Bank, 4 TC 252 (1944).
88 GOM 26690--1 CB 28 (1951).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
property has been excluded from the capital assets described
in Section 117(j) of the Code.s9 Nevertheless, both under the
ruling and the decision, subdivided "non-productive" property
would be specifically excluded as an asset and would still be
governed by Section 117(a) (1).
F. CHANGES MADE BY 1954 CODE
At the time of enacting the 1954 Code, Congress included a
new Section 1237 which deals with the topic of real property sub-
divided for sale.9" The provisions of this section would appear
to have a highly restricted application but it does amplify on
some of the points previously noted. As indicated above, the in-
tention to engage in a subdivision project would be controlling
unless that intention is defeated by a condition subsequent. The
statute now supplies such a condition subsequent which is made
up of three concurrent conditions, namely, lack of intention to
hold the property for sale, either this tract previously or other
property at the time of sale; lack of substantial improvements;
and a five-year holding period. No definition of the term "sub-
stantial improvements" appears except as it is spelled out in a
proviso to the effect that the installation of water and sewer facili-
ties and roads shall not be so considered if the lots should be held
for a ten-year period.91 In the event the three concurrent con-
ditions are satisfied, gains realized on the sale of the first five
lots are to be considered as capital gains. On the sale of the
remainder of the lots, 5% of the selling price thereof, less prop-
erly deductible expense, is taxable as ordinary income.92 There
is reason to think that the draftsman of this section could have
been more liberal and might well have extended relief to a wider
class of taxpayers but it remains to be seen whether the Com-
89 Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Commissioner, 22 TC - (No. 168), COH
Dec. 20,585 (1954).
90 Section 1237 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code falls within Part IV of the
statute. That part is devoted to the setting forth of certain special rules for
determining the presence of capital gains and losses.
911954 Int. Rev. Code, § 1237(b) (3) (A).
92 Ibid., § 1237(b) (1)-(2).
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missioner will devise new regulations and what the courts will
have to say when they are called upon to construe the term
"substantial improvements" as used in the statute.9
III. CoNcLusI oSs
By way of brief summary, it can be said that if an individual
subdivides land or engages in any activity related to the sale
thereof, the land will generally be considered as held for sale
with the proceeds of sale being taxable as ordinary income rather
than at capital gains rates. Frequency and continuity of sales
for the purpose of profit are evidence of an intention to engage
in this business, from which intention the existence of a
business and a consequent classification of its assets can
be made. The rule applies exclusively to individuals and
to their agents, as the asset classification of land held by
corporations will be determined by the powers thereof meas-
ured by the law of corporations. If land is subdivided subse-
quent to acquisition, the conduct of the subdivision and the
solicitation of sales will be evidence of a profit purpose. If,
however, the land has been subdivided prior to acquisition and
the lots are sold off without solicitation by the owner, evidence
of a profit purpose will be lacking. Under these circumstances,
the purpose of acquisition will establish the asset classification
rather than the circumstances of disposition, for the latter could
be of too passive a nature to support an inference of any kind.
The 1954 Code provisions on the point grant relief of a sort
but burdens the same with highly restricted concurrent condi-
tions, so the law with respect to the tax liability of the subdivider
is, as yet, not without its problems.
93 An extensive discussion of Section 1237 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code
appears in Manella, "Capital Gains and Losses Under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954," So. Cal. Tax Inst. Proceedings, 1955 Major Problems, pp. 735, 750-71.
